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And even if some emitters were to undertake major mitigation measures, they could not be certain that other emitters would reciprocate. Reducing national emissions amounts to the provision of a global 'public good' from which all countries would benefit, with concomitant powerful free-riding incentives. Such uncertainty about the behaviour of other emitters militates against a strong international agreement. The international politics of climate change is further complicated by the longstanding divide between developed and developing countries over how to divide up the mitigation burden, particularly in view of industrialized countries' historical responsibility for the bulk of emissions. 8 International society originally tried to get around these difficulties by creating an international climate regime with mandatory emission reduction targets. 9 International institution-building was meant to help build trust between emitters and reduce the threat of free-riding. Following the example of the successful international negotiations on ozone layer depletion, climate negotiators set out in the early 1990s to create the UNFCCC, which established the norm of climate protection. Building on this universal agreement, they then hoped to negotiate a series of regulatory instruments that would set ever-stricter targets for GHG emission reductions. The first such treaty, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, set relatively modest targets, which required industrialized countries (listed in Annex I) to reduce emissions by an average of 5 per cent against 1990 levels. Critically, Kyoto exempted developing countries from similar commitments, thereby establishing a strong form of differentiation that postponed mitigation action by developing countries for an unspecified time. In theory, the Kyoto Protocol was meant to be only a first step. Much like the Montreal Protocol on substances depleting the ozone layer, it was meant to be revised and strengthened, and the 2009 Copenhagen conference was expected to produce a successor agreement that would also include mitigation efforts by non-Annex I countries, some of which (e.g. China) had seen their emissions increase dramatically in the years since Kyoto. This was not how it worked out, however.
In the end, the Annex I countries were able collectively to comply with the treaty's provisions, but this did little to slow the rise in global emissions. There are several reasons why the Kyoto Protocol does not offer a viable approach to mitigating climate change. First, by setting a static emissions reduction target, the regime failed to create dynamic incentives to decarbonize the economy.
While some countries (e.g. Canada) failed to meet the Kyoto targets, others reduced emissions without making any effort: such was the case for Russia and other post-Soviet states that experienced de-industrialization after the collapse of communism. Second, agreeing new targets for a second commitment period after 2012 proved difficult because the focus on legally binding targets had turned the climate negotiations into a distributional conflict over respective shares of the mitigation burden. Industrialized countries that had struggled or failed to comply with Kyoto were reluctant to subject themselves again to another set of rigid targets: as a result, Canada withdrew from the treaty while Japan and Russia declared they would not enter into new commitments. Third, the rigid divide between Annex I and non-Annex I countries had made it difficult to deal with the rapidly rising emissions of emerging economies that did not want to stifle their future economic development by imposing limits on future emissions.
Although seen as a failure at the time, the 2009 Copenhagen conference (COP-15) succeeded in laying the ground for a new approach that has now come to fruition in the Paris Agreement. 10 After two weeks of fruitless negotiations by diplomats and regulatory experts at COP-15, a select group of heads of state hammered out a political compromise deal, the Copenhagen Accord, which foreshadowed many of the elements now contained in the Paris Agreement.
Sidestepping the thorny issue of internationally agreed and legally binding emissions targets, Barack Obama for the United States, Wen Jiabao for China, voluntary pledges as the basis for future climate action. For the first time, major emitters from the developing world showed a willingness to contribute to the global mitigation effort without waiting for developed countries to fully implement their existing commitments. The Copenhagen Accord thus finally did away with the Kyoto Protocol's 'firewall' between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, paving the way for a more comprehensive mitigation deal.
Copenhagen also saw the beginning of other innovations in climate policy, from the Green Climate Fund and a promise of up to US$100 billion a year by 2020 of climate finance to fund mitigation and adaptation in developing countries to a system for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions and financial contributions.
Developments at the subnational and regional level are key to understanding the gradual transformation that has occurred in international climate politics. While concern over climate change was on the rise throughout the 2000s, it was towards the end of the decade that critical momentum was built for a global agreement. Even in countries that had been laggards in the international negotiations, such as the United States, a groundswell of bottom-up initiatives had begun to change the political agenda. 11 million that year. 17 The groundswell of domestic climate action has made it more likely that major emitters will contribute to a collective international effort, even if most continue to oppose mandatory emissions reductions.
One important factor behind this shift is the growing recognition among major polluters that the obstacles to a low-carbon energy transition are not as high as had been previously thought. As more and more emission-reducing and energy-saving policies have been put in place, gradual technological improvements, market competition and greater economies of scale have pushed down the costs of low-carbon technologies. Solar photovoltaic energy, for example, has become a cost-effective energy source in many parts of the world. Achieving a rapid reduction in emissions is still perceived by many states as a costly affair, but major emitters have grown more confident that a gradual shift towards a low-carbon economy will not necessarily harm their long-term growth strategies. This shift in attitudes was clearly visible in the run-up to the 2015 Paris climate summit. Having already agreed at the Copenhagen summit to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy, the Chinese government now signalled that it was willing to commit to no further rise in GHG emissions after 2030. 21 The United States, too, has indicated a greater willingness to work with 17 the international community to achieve significant emissions reductions.
Benefiting from a switch towards shale gas and a reversal of previous emissions trends, the US administration under President Obama is now using existing regulatory authorities to shift energy production away from coal. 22 It was in the context of these domestic political and economic shifts that One of the positive outcomes of this new approach was the transformation in the international process that allowed the parties to achieve important breakthroughs such as the inclusion of a more ambitious temperature target. The Paris Agreement commits parties to 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C' (article 2(1)a). 25 It was only after Pacific island states demanded a reduction in the target to 1.5°C, a demand that civil society groups also supported, that an additional clause was added stating parties' commitment 'to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'. The Paris Agreement thus goes beyond the previously agreed 2°C target, even though 1.5°C remains an aspiration rather than a prescription. 24 Lenore Taylor and Tania Branigan, 'US and China strike deal on carbon cuts in push for global climate change pact', Guardian, 12 Nov. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-makecarbon-pledge. 25 Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
Significantly, the Paris Agreement also includes a long-term emissions goal, a key demand by civil society groups and developing countries. 26 Article 4(1) states that 'Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible' and to achieve 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century'. The notion of emissions balance, which was referred to in an earlier draft of the treaty as 'emissions neutrality', suggests that GHG emissions will need to come down to a 'net zero' level between 2050 and 2100; UNEP had previously called for this to be achieved for CO2 emissions by 2070. 27 In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, which lacked long-term targets, the Paris Agreement thus sends an important signal to global markets, and especially to institutional investors, though it is weakened by the lack of a specific timetable and uncertainty over the future use of carbon sinks. Achieving the Paris goals will require global investment in carbon sequestration programmes, but large-scale afforestation is bound to create food security concerns, while the technical and economic viability of carbon capture and storage remains uncertain.
In order to achieve long-term emissions reductions, the Paris Agreement obliges parties to submit pledges-so-called 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs)-on a regular basis. It is this reliance on countries' voluntary climate policy ambition that marks the most significant departure from the Kyoto Protocol approach. Rather than establishing a set of quantitative emissions reductions that are internationally agreed, the Paris Agreement sidesteps the distributional conflict inherent in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations by leaving it to individual countries to determine how much they wish to contribute to the collective mitigation effort. NDCs are to be submitted at regular intervals of five years (article 4(9)), and the agreement expects new pledges to exceed the ambition of existing ones so as to raise the climate ambition overall.
That such a progression of climate policy ambition will be needed is clear from the 160 'intended' NDCs that were submitted as part of the effort to create Tracker estimates, these pledges are insufficient to prevent global temperatures from rising beyond 2°C; indeed, they are projected to lead to global warming of 2.7°C or more. 28 The main mechanism for raising the level of ambition in the climate regime will be a regular review of progress made towards the agreement's temperature goal. A first interim review, known as the 'facilitative dialogue', will take place in 2018, prior to the agreement's expected entry into force. The first formal review, referred to in the agreement as the 'global stocktake' (article 14(1)), is scheduled for 2023, with subsequent iterations every five years thereafter. The outcome of these reviews is meant to inform parties as they formulate future NDCs, with a view to 'updating and enhancing' their pledges (article 14(3)). By establishing a system of mandatory national reporting, which includes information on national emissions by sources and removals of GHGs by carbon sinks, the Paris Agreement makes transparency a key regulatory instrument aimed at building trust between the parties and enabling them to review the implementation of national pledges (article 13).
In a second major break with the regulatory approach of the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement includes all countries in its mitigation effort. ('shall') while others merely express recommendations ('should') or create expressions of intent or opinion ('will', 'recognize'). 33 Thus, once the agreement has entered into force, parties will be legally obliged to submit NDCs and report on them every five years, but failure to comply with their own national climate plans will not constitute a breach of international law. In any case, the agreement's compliance mechanism is explicitly designed to 'be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, nonadversarial and non-punitive' (article 15(2)). Even where parties are in breach of treaty provisions, they will not face punitive sanctions as they might in other international agreements such as those of the WTO.
The question, therefore, is not whether the Paris Agreement is legally binding or not, as some observers have argued. 34 The issue is whether, given its peculiar legal structure, which restricts legal obligations primarily to procedural questions and leaves decisions on how much countries contribute to the global climate effort in their own hands, it can make a difference to the global effort to In assessing the Paris Agreement, it is important to bear in mind the nature of the global policy challenge. More than two decades after the adoption of the UNFCCC, it is becoming much clearer that effective climate policy is not about finding quick fixes to an emissions problem but putting in place the structure for a long-term technological and economic transformation. Averting dangerous global warming will require major investment in low-carbon technologies and a redesign of existing transport and urban infrastructures. To add to the complexity of the task, all of this will need to be achieved on a global scale and sustained over decades. Any expectation, therefore, that a single international summit or treaty could provide the breakthrough solution, was always illusory. 37 The question now is not whether the Paris Agreement will 'fix' global warming, but whether it provides a robust yet adaptable framework for 35 Tom Bawden, 'COP-21: Paris deal far too weak to prevent devastating climate change, academics warn', Independent, 8 Jan. 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/cop21-paris-dealfar-too-weak-to-prevent-devastating-climate-change-academics-warna6803096.html. 36 For some (e.g. Russia, Canada and Australia), Kyoto had next to no effect on national emissions paths, while others (e.g. Japan) gradually drifted away from the treaty. The EU was arguably the only group of major emitters that remained committed to implementing its commitments under the treaty; but even in Europe's case it is difficult to argue that international treaty obligations rather than domestic pressures and concerns were the main driver of climate policy. In any case, with Canada, Russia and Japan having withdrawn from the treaty's second commitment period, the Kyoto Protocol now covers no more than 15 per cent of global GHG emissions. Yet, paradoxically, while the Kyoto Protocol has gradually fallen out of favour, most major emitters have if anything stepped up domestic efforts to bring emissions under control. The key difference is that they have chosen policies that reflect domestic, rather than international, priorities and circumstances.
To some extent, therefore, the Paris Agreement offers a more realistic chance of governments implementing their NDCs because climate change has become a firmly established part of public policy around the world. Nearly all major emitters of GHGs have established laws and regulations dealing with emission controls, energy efficiency standards, forestry management and lowcarbon technological innovation. In total, nearly 500 laws related to climate change have been introduced since 1990. 39 However, while there is a uniform trend towards greater legislative action on climate change, the drivers behind countries' climate policies vary considerably. To some extent, material factors provide a reliable proxy explanation of a country's stance on climate change. Differences in countries' level of economic development, resource endowment and exposure to climate impacts explain why relatively poor, low-lying, island states without fossil fuel reserves (e.g. the Maldives) favour strict international mitigation policies and international financing of local adaptation measures, while relatively wealthy countries whose economies depend on the exploitation of fossil fuels (e.g. Saudi Arabia) tend to oppose global curbs on GHG emissions.
For most other countries, which find themselves in between these two extreme cases, the situation is more complex. The costs resulting from climate change impacts and mitigation measures tend to be unevenly distributed within most societies, which makes it difficult to apply straightforward calculations of aggregate cost and benefit to explain national climate policy stances. For this hybrid system to work, the Paris Agreement needs to put in place a transparency regime that makes national policies internationally comparable.
Transparency is a key condition for making national pledges credible and building trust between major emitters. In this respect, the Paris conference delivered mixed results at best. While it brings us one step closer to comparable mitigation pledges and policies, laying down principles for an integrated reporting system that has been in the making for some time under the auspices of the UNFCCC, it did not deliver the specific rules that will govern the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions and national implementation of those pledges and policies. Given that many countries have been wary of ceding control over what and how they report to the UNFCCC, it will take considerable effort at future COPs to negotiate the modalities of the new transparency regime.
Getting transparency right will be of critical importance to the Paris Agreement's review mechanism, which is the central tool for driving up ambition 40 Robert O. Keohane and Michael Oppenheimer, 'Paris: beyond the climate dead end through pledge and review?', Politics and Governance, forthcoming Aug. 2016, available at http://www.cogitatiopress.com/ojs/index.php/politicsandgovernance/index. within the UNFCCC regime. The review mechanism is likely to generate pressure on states in two ways. The first is peer pressure among states. At the five-yearly review sessions, the parties to the Paris Agreement will ideally be able to establish which countries have delivered on their previous pledges and whether new and more ambitious pledges are needed to meet the temperature target.
The formalized review process will create regular moments for 'naming and shaming' strategies to be deployed against those countries that fall short of international expectations. Given that mitigation pledges will be determined independently by each party and cannot be enforced through the regime's compliance mechanism, international review and peer pressure will be the main multilateral tools for parties to strengthen the credibility of their pledges. In an ideal scenario, leaders in climate policy will use the review mechanism to signal high ambition and exhort laggards to raise their game, in the hope that successful 44 Once the Paris Agreement enters into force, civil society organizations can be expected to continue to scrutinize national policies and their implementation, and to calculate the world's remaining carbon budget and the additional efforts states will need to make to stay within this budget. As in other contexts, civil society can therefore be expected to take on the role of informal monitor of the climate agreement, using naming and shaming tactics to target those governments that shirk their responsibilities. 45 Despite the important role that non-state actors can play in this area, the outlook for accountability at the hands of civil society is uncertain and highly uneven. Domestic monitoring of national policies depends on the capacity of civil society to organize and exert pressure on governments and the degree to which civil society enjoys a permissive environment domestically. Research on domestic environmental politics reveals starkly divergent fortunes for environmental NGOs, for example between those operating in democratic states with open, pluralistic political cultures and those that face tight political control by autocratic regimes. As Bailey and Tomlinson point out, the 'safe operating space' for independent monitoring is shrinking in many countries, and especially 'in precisely those countries where [it is] most needed'. 46 There are also important differences in levels of domestic mobilization, engagement and financing of NGO activities, with the dividing line often falling between richer and poorer societies. To some extent, transnational campaign groups can substitute for domestic activism in countries that lack a vibrant civil society. 47 Even so, we should not expect the monitoring ability of civil society to be equally distributed around the world.
Finally, given that the decarbonization of the global economy will be down to decisions by economic actors, the Paris Agreement will ultimately be judged by the effect it has on global markets. International regimes and governmental regulation can provide a supportive regulatory framework, but it is companies that decide on the direction of technological innovation, R&D expenditure and investment flows. In this context, an international treaty such as the Paris Agreement can hope to shape business decisions in three ways: it can send a signal to markets about the international community's long-term political objectives; it can put in place governance mechanisms that create incentives for low-carbon business decisions; and it can encourage and support voluntary efforts by private actors.
With regard to signalling, global business leaders had encouraged governments to create an ambitious climate agreement that would produce certainty for long-term investment decisions. 48 By strengthening the in place a framework for creating governance mechanisms, but postponed the tricky task of agreeing specific rules. The parties renewed international support for developing and expanding carbon markets, endorsing the creation of a new type of carbon asset, so-called 'internationally transferred mitigation outcomes'.
They also established an UNFCCC-governed mechanism that will support international transfers of emission reductions, but without agreeing the specific rules and procedures that will govern it; these will need to be agreed by future COPs. And finally, the Paris conference became a catalyst for the creation of a wide range of voluntary initiatives that engage business actors and others in collaborative efforts to reduce emissions, promote best-practice models and encourage technology transfer. 49 In this way, the Paris accord can become an 'orchestrator' of climate action well beyond the realm of traditional international governance, drawing on the governance capabilities of other actors that the climate regime itself lacks. 50 Notwithstanding all these positive elements, it is clear that the within the new logic of nationally determined climate action, the Paris Agreement cannot be expected to 'fix' the climate problem; it can only provide a supportive framework within which states and other actors can achieve the required emissions cuts.
Conclusions
The COP-21 outcome has been rightly welcomed as a major breakthrough in international climate diplomacy. After years of fruitless efforts to strike a global deal on mandatory emissions reductions, the new regulatory approach adopted Whether the Paris Agreement can produce the desired effect of boosting the global mitigation effort remains to be seen. This critically depends on whether its core mechanism of five-yearly reviews can be made to work. For this to happen, a robust transparency framework for the reporting and verification of emissions reduction pledges and their national implementation will be needed.
COP-21 established the principles for this framework, but future negotiations will need to create specific transparency rules and mechanisms. It also remains to be seen whether peer pressure between states and 'naming and shaming' strategies by NGOs can nudge recalcitrant states into greater ambition. The Paris negotiations managed to produce a high level of political mobilization and support on the part of civil society and business, which in itself is a major achievement. But it would take only a small number of large emitters to derail global efforts to stay within the temperature target of below 2°C. Given that the world is currently on course for a global warming trend of 3°C or more, the margin of error for the new climate regime is worryingly small.
In the context of the new logic of domestically determined climate policy, much will depend on whether climate leaders are willing and able to push for more ambitious policies, invest in green technologies and chart the way into a low-carbon economic future. Such leadership could be provided by states that seek to move faster and further with decarbonization plans than their peers.
Small groups of states, acting in 'coalitions of the willing' or 'climate clubs', may emerge to create regional carbon trading schemes or promote technology transfer schemes. 51 Leadership could also be provided by non-state actors, most notably business organizations and NGOs that come together to establish transnational climate actions and voluntarily cooperate to pursue low-carbon strategies. The Paris Agreement will benefit from such forms of climate leadership, and it can play an important role in providing a supportive environment in which innovative initiatives can be encouraged and nurtured.
As should be clear from the above discussion, much of the Paris Agreement's potential contribution remains to be developed in future COP negotiations. Paris was a breakthrough event, but it did not 'fix' the climate problem. Nor could it have hoped to do so. International climate diplomacy has finally caught up with the reality of the global warming problem, which requires a long-term political effort to steer global investment in the direction of a lowcarbon economic future. Paris provides a more realistic approach to achieving this vision, but it is not the end of this journey; in many ways it is only the beginning.
